INTRODUCTION

Muslims in / of the Caribbean

My grandfather was a Muslim
And my daddy was a Rasta.

—Khāled Siddīq

I was entitled to the feast of Husein, to the mirrors and crepe-paper temples of the Muslim epic.… The palms and the Muslim minarets are Antillean exclamations.

—Derek Walcott

Not every Muslim in the Caribbean is East Indian.[1] As British Jamaican singer and YouTube star Khāled Siddīq sings to a reggae beat in "My Grandfather Was a Muslim," his Afro-Jamaican grandfather or enslaved ancestors past could have been Muslims, even if his real or metaphorical father became a Jamaican Rastafarian.[2] Similarly, Jamaican Muslim artist Sayeed Tijani (Tijani Concious [*sic*]) sings an ode to the "Fulani Woman" as the ideal African and Afro-Jamaican Muslim woman.[3] Siddīq and Tijani emphasize that Islam in Jamaica and the Caribbean is as religiously linked to Africa as are syncretic polytheistic Caribbean religions like Santería and Obeah. They suggest that Afro-Caribbean Muslims like them are not converts but, rather, *reverts* to ancestral African Islamic lineages lost to the Middle Passage. Tijani takes as a name the epithet "Tijani," denoting a follower of North African Sufi reformist leader and mystic Ahmad al-Tijānī (1737–1815). In "Baye Niasse (Boom Baye)," Tijani also follows in the musical footsteps of famed Senegalese singer Youssou N'Dour to call on Emir Baay Ibrahim Niasse (1900–1975), founder of the West African Ibrāhīmiyyah branch of the Sufi Tijāniyyah *tarīqa* brotherhood, to solve the social ills of, in this case, Jamaica.[4] Of his Muslim grandfather and Rastafarian father, Siddīq sings, "They were searching for the truth / And the Qur'an it gave the answer." Anticolonial, Old Testament– and Ethiopian history–influenced Rastafarianism is one step toward the liberation of the African diaspora in the New World, but the final answer to the Caribbean search for African roots and spiritual truth, Siddīq implies, is Islam.

That the legacy of Africa in the Caribbean includes Islam is history worth emphasizing when Caribbean Muslims are commonly assumed to be all descendants of South Asian Indian indentured laborers, particularly in Guyana, Trinidad, Jamaica, and Suriname, the countries in which those Hindu, Muslim, and Christian descendants are a relatively cohesive ethnic community. The St. Lucian writer Derek Walcott frames his 1992 Nobel Prize in Literature lecture with an account of the Hindu Indo-Caribbean villagers of Felicity, Trinidad, preparing their costumes and *murtis*—representations of the gods—to perform the *Ramleela*, the dramatization of the epic *Ramayana*. He invokes Asia as an unfolding temporal, material, and historic space not *in* the Caribbean, but *of* the Caribbean. The *Ramleela* is not the "visual echo of History" he had expected, nor a fragment of lost memory, nor "degenerative mimicry," but a "dialect" that was "not a distortion or even a reduction of its epic scale."[5] In this large-scale performance of a Hindu epic on a field, under the open sky, Walcott sees not simply the static preservation and remembrance of a religious tradition, but an ongoing reconstitution of Hinduism and the relocation of mythic Asia to the Caribbean. On the strength of the players' faith and conviction—they are named true believers, rather than theatrical actors or "amateurs"—the *Ramleela*, performed in a field that may have once been a cane field in which the worshipers' indentured ancestors and enslaved Africans toiled, becomes part of the Caribbean landscape. The *Ramleela* also reminds Walcott that there are other non-African, non-Indian migrant cultural forces at work in the Caribbean: English, Jewish, Chinese, and Lebanese.[6] The indigenous remain annihilated and unmentioned, though they still live in ecologically compromised circumstances with little state power in countries dominated by people of African and Indian descent in Guyana, Suriname, and Dominica.

The *landscape* of Walcott's Caribbean difference is exemplified by the "Muslim minaret," tall as a palm tree and just as at home against the Antillean sky. The more obvious architectural visual referent to Islam, the round central dome of a mosque, is ignored in favor of the alliterative Muslim minaret, the corner pillar from which the muezzin delivers the five-times-daily Islamic call to prayer. Through both its visual markers and its distinctive soundscape, Islam writes itself and the Qur'anic Word of God onto the islands (and continental Guyana and Suriname). We do not learn directly from Walcott the specific identity of the people of the minaret the way we learn about the Hindus performing the *Ramleela*. The Levantine Arabs he mentions, who migrated to the Caribbean and the United States from the late nineteenth century through the interwar period of the twentieth century, were predominantly Christian Orthodox, Maronite, and Melkite. There is a clue, however, in Walcott's realization that as a Caribbean writer, the cultural field of Islam open to him includes the "feast of Husein" and the "crepe-paper temples of the Muslim epic." These are references to the Muslim Indo-Caribbean festival of Hosay, the originally Shi'a Muslim commemoration of the martyrdom of the Prophet Muhammad's grandson Hussein. Hussein gives his

name to Hosay in Trinidad and Hussay in Jamaica, though in Guyana and Suriname the festival is called Tadjah and Taziya, after the commemorative model tombs carried in Hosay processions and the Arabo-Persian term *ta'zīya*, meaning grief-comfort or condolence. Tellingly, Walcott thinks of Islam in the context of an Indian Hindu festival, implying that for him Islam in the Caribbean is Indian, not African.

In 1970, the number of Muslims in Guyana peaked at 9.1 percent and in Trinidad at 6.26 percent of the population. These numbers have decreased as a result of migration to England and North America.[7] Muslims represented 13.5 percent of Surinamese in 2004 (this percentage includes Javanese and Indian Muslims), and a statistically negligible 0.04 percent of Jamaicans in 2001.[8] Approximately 543,700 Indian indentured laborers were brought to the Caribbean between 1838 and 1917, following the end of African slavery in the British Caribbean colonies. Estimates of the number of these who were Muslim vary between 6 and 14 percent. The vast majority of Muslim migrants were Sunni, with small numbers of Shi'a. The Sunnis were generally of the Hanafi *fiqh*, the largest school of Sunni Muslim jurisprudence whose adherents span the Indian subcontinent, Turkey, Eastern Europe, Egypt, and China.[9] Though they gave nineteenth-century Caribbean Islam its defining public ritual celebration of Hosay, there are very small numbers of practicing Shi'a in the Caribbean today. From the early twentieth century onward, international missionary activity has resulted in the Ahmadiyya reformist sect becoming the most vocal minority Muslim sect in the Caribbean, in contrast to its current persecution and disenfranchisement in Pakistan, where it originated in the late nineteenth century and where it was in 1974 declared doctrinally non-Muslim by the state.

The Islam that Walcott recognizes as Caribbean, the religion of most mosques and minarets in Trinidad, is a heavily subcontinental Sunni one, with Shi'a influence and Ahmadi visibility: an intrareligious, intersectarian, syncretic Caribbean faith. But that iteration of hybrid, migrant Caribbean Islam that nonetheless remains Indian, does not account for a number of factors: the history of enslaved Africans' Islam in the New World, Caribbean Islam's relationship to Hinduism, the place of the Caribbean Muslim in contemporary global narratives of terrorism and religious citizenship, and a global Muslim religious identity that is continuously and now more visibly disaggregating from race and place. The "new" Caribbean Muslim of the twenty-first century can be a "born" Indo-Caribbean Muslim or an Afro-Caribbean convert, a local, or a transnational person living between the Caribbean and North America or Europe. Beginning in the 1970s, Caribbean Muslims have also contended with worldwide revivalist *tajdīd* and reformist *islah* Islamic projects, and a growing Islamization of local religious practices deemed "cultural," a movement loosely termed in the Saudi and Egyptian contexts the Islamic Revival or Awakening (*as-Sahwa al-'Islāmiyyah*), which Saba Mahmood identifies as including both "the activities of state-oriented political

groups" and the development of a fairly conservative, piety-oriented "religious ethos or sensibility" in majority Muslim countries.[10] Charles Kurzman quantifies the triple forces at work in the last two centuries of worldwide Muslim debates over Islamic praxis as customary Islam, revivalist Islam, and liberal Islam, the latter of which "calls upon the past in the name of modernity, while revivalists might be said to call upon modernity . . . in the name of the past."[11] These conflicting and overlapping forces manifest in the Muslim Caribbean in multiple ways discussed in this book: as conflicts between perceived traditional "Indo-Iranian" Islam and various types of Islamic "orthodoxy" influenced by missionizing from and education in Libya, Egypt, and the Gulf States; as suspicions that Indo-Caribbean Islam is untowardly influenced by Hinduism; as assertions that Islam is not rightfully a religion of African diaspora people in the Americas, and that when they convert, they have violent fundamentalist leanings mysteriously linked to Malcolm X and the Nation of Islam; and that Caribbean Muslims' regional belonging and citizenship is superseded by their allegiance to global Islam.

There is no Muslim country or Muslim society per se in the Caribbean. Yet Caribbean Muslims have always had a sense of themselves as part of the global *ummah* (community), whether as displaced branches of South Asian or African Islam, or, now, as people who look to the Arab world for a sense of cultural and religious origin and political orientation, in a time of ongoing U.S. imperialist military action in the Middle East. This book argues, above all, that the Caribbean Muslim subject, whom I call by the Guyanese term for a Muslim of any race, the "fullaman," has never been fixed or static. Furthermore, the long-standing presence of Muslims and shifting negotiations of Muslim identity in the Caribbean demonstrate the fruition of a process that the United States and European countries with large numbers of Muslim migrants and refugees have only recently begun to acknowledge: that Islam always functions as a racial category. Islam has been racialized from medieval European crusader imaginings of the Saracen, to the colonial Arab and Turkish harems of orientalist fantasies, to stereotypes of Salafi European immigrant men radicalized into the Islamic State on the Internet, to its Indo-Caribbean minarets against the Antillean sky.

Through analysis of literary texts and music by and about Caribbean Muslims, this book makes three central arguments: first, that the Muslim subject in the Caribbean, the *fullaman* (from, as I will discuss, the African tribal name Fulani), is a temporal figure that traverses the path of the racialized Caribbean labor subject from premodern, non-European, native "savage" Caliban, to modernity's African plantation slave, to late colonialism's Asian indentured laborer. The colonial fullaman begins as the "Eastern" savage infiltrator in the New World, the Arab or North African Moor or *Morisco*, who enters the early Spanish colonies as an illegal migrant or slave at a post-Reconquista time when "the term *Moor* did not connote racial characteristics as much as cultural, specifically Islamic, ones."[12] The entry of Moors, Jews, Protestants, and "Gypsies" into Spanish colonies was

barred or limited up to the twentieth century; many of the *Moriscos* who nonetheless entered in the early colonial era were women, and the figure of the *Morisca* became racially conflated with the mixed-race, brown-skinned *mulata*.[13] After the Moor and *Morisco*, the colonial American fullaman, specter of Islam in the New World, inhabited the enslaved Muslim West African from the regions of Guinea, Senegal, Nigeria, Mali, and Côte-d'Ivoire, then the "Mahometan Hindoo" indentured laborer from British India.[14] Caliban, the deformed island man who is taught to speak and forced into servitude by the European magician Prospero in Shakespeare's *The Tempest*—a play that was influenced by colonial fantasies of Americas hurricanes' force and geographic and climatological alienness—became a literary metaphor for the "hybrid" Caribbean man with Roberto Fernández Retamar's 1979 privileging of Caliban over earlier Latin American and U.S. figurations of Ariel the sprite as embodiment of the Americas.[15] Caliban has been taken up by Edward Kamau Brathwaite, Aimé Césaire, David Dabydeen, Paget Henry, and other Caribbean writers as the representative Caribbean (post)colonial. As Jodi Byrd argues, however, "the translocation of indigeneity from the prior Ariel to Caliban and his mother, Sycorax, enacts the machinations of settler discourses that detach indigeneity from the original inhabitants of the Americas and relocate it on settlers and arrivants themselves."[16] The danger of "overdetermined" Caliban "is that every time a claim to Caliban is made from within or without empire . . . colonization is maintained with a difference."[17] I show that rather than being another iteration of Caliban that elides indigeneity, the Muslim fullman is interpellated into Caribbean postcolonial citizenship through the same indigenous signification that produces settlers, the Afro-Caribbean, and Caliban himself as native. Still, Caliban retains direct affiliation with the fullaman not only because both have been dehumanized, forced laborers in the Americas, but because the origins of Caliban and his witchy mother, Sycorax, lie in Algiers: the exotic, villainous Muslim Others of Shakespeare's Elizabethan England transmogrified into the amoral, hybrid monsters of the New World. The fullaman transgresses the colonial legacy of racialized Caribbean labor categories through a shifting engagement with global Islamic modernity and the worldwide *ummah*, as defined later.

Second, the book shows that the figure of the fullaman neither resists nor fully enters discourses of creolization and syncretism that are fundamental to postcolonial nationalisms in the Caribbean. The fullaman simultaneously deconstructs essentialist ideas of the religious Muslim and provides an alternative iteration of the Caribbean "mimic man" of Trinidadian novelist and literary Nobel Prize winner V. S. Naipaul. The mimic man, in Caribbean postcolonial parlance, is the former slave or indentured laborer who has lost his ancestral culture and language, and poorly imitates the tongue, cultural practices, and governmental structure of the European colonizer, dooming him to personal and national failure after colonial independence. Naipaul's work, as shown here, contains the genesis of both the Caribbean mimic man and the specific iteration of the Muslim Caribbean

mimic man. The Muslim mimic man appears in Caribbean literature in the form of a postcolonial person who looks to the Middle East, rather than to Britain or Europe, as his or her metropolitan cultural referent.

Third, this book demonstrates that the Caribbean Muslim fullaman is a fluid, *performative* identity. For the fullaman, as perhaps for a person of any faith, religious identity is often performative, in the sense that ongoing ritual, sartorial, and other private and public actions may change social and material reality and perceptions of and by the adherent and religious community. The fullaman's form and boundaries shift. For women, there is a double performativity of gendered religion. Muslim theater may be performed by pious women, for example, through ritual prayer (*salah* or *namāz*) that requires specific dress and emotional and intentional affect. Saba Mahmood identifies this as "rehearsed spontaneity" in Egypt: women rehearse behavior and *feeling*, and produce pious Islamic belonging through dress, thought, and material practices, until "Muslim" affect becomes natural to their bodies.[18] Rehearsed spontaneity may be viewed as doctrinal or customary. Talal Asad, identifying the problematics of an "anthropology of Islam" in 1986, points out that the customary scholarly opposition between "Great" (orthodox) and "Little" (nonorthodox) religious traditions is in fact orientalist, reifying distinctions between "East" and "West" and ignoring the fact that both scriptural orthodoxy and local religious customs are highly variable in Islam.[19] As an object of study, Islam, Asad argues, "should be approached as a discursive tradition that connects variously with the formation of moral selves, the manipulation of populations (or resistance to it), and the production of appropriate knowledges."[20] Fluid performances of Muslim religiosity contradict a common view of both Caribbean Muslims and Indo-Caribbean people as racialized, static, and religiously saturated. Viranjini Munasinghe argues that Indians in the colonial Caribbean were considered "culturally saturated," with "[b]iologization of East Indian [cultural] traits, which are viewed as immutable, ingrained in nature."[21] Fullaman identity is always in the process of becoming, in relation to other Muslims and to non-Muslims, and its momentary fixity and locus of enunciation in any time and place are often determined by the dress and "moral" behavior of Muslim women.

My methodology is one that combines archival, historiographic, and ethnographic framing with cultural studies and postcolonial theory in the analysis of literature. The core is literary analysis. Each chapter, with the exception of the fourth, which blends analysis of a novel and music, is a literary diptych preceded by the aforementioned framework, a structure I have chosen because there is not enough analysis or common contextual knowledge of lived Islam in the Anglophone Caribbean to proceed solely with relatively abstract literary readings, even when those readings act as much-needed supplements to the archive. My position is that when it is not widely known that a people even exist, their historical journey must first be acknowledged, but not defensively so. In the diptych struc-

ture, I begin with an older literary work or works that shed light on a newer one, and bolster the argument that Islam has been in the Caribbean a long time, under many ethnic and sectarian guises. The settings of the older works of the diptychs in each chapter are in chronological order with each other. The works in the fourth chapter, on the 1990 Jamaat al Muslimeen attempted government coup in Trinidad, are literature and music, so I have interwoven them in counterpoint to each other. Two significant interviews anchor my ethnographic work on Islam in the Caribbean: one with Yasin Abu Bakr, leader of the Trinidadian Jamaat al Muslimeen, who occupies the imagined place of the originary Caribbean Muslim "terrorist" in the view of both Trinidadians and the U.S. government; and the other with Anesa Ahamad, the Trinidadian medical doctor who, in 1995, was the first Muslim woman to give a Friday *Jumu'ah khutbah* sermon in a Caribbean mosque. Also instructive were my interactions with calypsonians from Trinidad, including David Rudder, Cro Cro (Weston Rawlins), G. B. (Gregory Ballantyne), and Vincentian Brother Ebony (Fitzroy Joseph), who generously allowed me to quote their songs on Muslims, race, and the Muslimeen coup in Trinidad. I spent significant time in the National Archives of Guyana perusing the *Voice of Islam*, the colonial-era Indo-Muslim newspaper of British Guiana, and the *Clarion*, the Muslim Black Nationalist revolutionary newspaper of 1960s British Guiana (as of independence in 1966, Guyana). All in all, there is slippage in field positioning in this ostensibly literary academic book. Traces of my own Caribbean fullaman life are also woven throughout, in the inspirational spirit of Audre Lorde's biomythography, a subaltern genre of producing a literary and experiential whole by simultaneously writing the self and the story of one's people. The genre is inspired by Lorde's own Grenadian, Carriacou, and Bajan (Barbadian) Caribbean heritage, originating in her resistance to the silencing of queer Afro-Caribbean *zami* women.[22] My interdisciplinary methodology is a purposeful, field-establishing choice in the understudied, undertheorized nascent field of Muslim and Islamic Caribbean Studies. "Muslim," in this formulation, refers to adherents and their cultural and other lived practices, also acknowledging that, as Junaid Rana says, "the Muslim" can be "a unit of analysis that is central to the examination of Islamic societies, cultures, and communities," even as the figure "is also a transmigratory, global figure that enters and exits multiple terrains."[23] By contrast, "Islam" here indicates religious and doctrinal concerns that do not always overlap with cultural practices or identity formulations.

I focus on the Muslim literature of the Anglophone Caribbean nations of Guyana, Trinidad, and Jamaica. Suriname, a former Dutch South American colony, is home to the largest population of Muslims in South America and the Caribbean, and has produced one very important regional Muslim text: *Jeevan Prakash*, the recently translated autobiography of Munshi Rahman Khan (1874–1972), a Muslim Indian indentured laborer in Suriname.[24] *Jeevan Prakash* is a masterwork of the Munshi's (teacher's) autobiographical and poetic literary ability, and

holds important documentation of the shifting and surprisingly conciliatory relationships between Hindu and Muslim indentured laborers in the region before and after the British Partition of India. It is important, however, to be thoroughly conversant with Dutch, Sranan Tongo, Javanese, and Sarnami Hindoestani literature and culture in order to do the work of examining formulations of the Surinamese Muslim, and including that figure in a book that is primarily on the Anglophone Caribbean would not do it justice. However, I pay equal or more national attention to Guyana, which has the second-largest population of Muslims in the Caribbean, and which is significantly understudied in comparison to Trinidad and Jamaica. The latter two countries are simply more accessible to more scholars, particularly English-speaking scholars, for socioeconomic, educational, linguistic, and geographic reasons. I discuss Muslims and the development of Islamic identities in countries that offer comparative Muslim histories of African slavery and Indian indentureship; as such, I do not address the growing and also understudied Muslim communities in Hispanophone Caribbean countries like Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic, and in Brazil, Mexico, and other countries in the American hemisphere.

This book is a literary complement to existing Islamic and Caribbean studies work in anthropology, history, gender studies, Indo-Caribbean studies, and, recently and problematically, security studies. Before the late twentieth century, there was but a small body of literature by and about Caribbean Muslims, not enough for drawing any major conclusions, and most of the groundbreaking work on Caribbean Islam and Muslims was produced by anthropologists and historians, including Edward E. Curtis, Sylviane Diouf, Michael A. Gomez, Paul Lovejoy, and Maureen Warner-Lewis on the Afro-Muslim Caribbean, and Raymond Chickrie, Gabrielle Hosein, Halima Sa'adia Kassim, Aisha Khan, Frank Korom, and Patricia Mohammed on the Indo-Muslim Caribbean. The divisions are notably ethnic. I, however, take a comparative approach that looks at Afro-Caribbean and Indo-Caribbean Muslims together, as they are the two largest historical and contemporary groups of Muslims in the Anglophone Caribbean, and they have intersected and shared space and social and political concerns since the Indo-Caribbean community came into being in 1838.

I conceive of the field of Muslim and Islamic Caribbean studies as falling primarily within the postcolonial and area studies discipline of Caribbean studies. Muslim and Islamic Caribbean studies is concerned with the general Caribbean studies field issues of racial identities, postcolonial citizenship, cultural creolization and hybridity, and economic neo-imperialism in the region. Still, Muslim and Islamic Caribbean studies necessarily has a lateral relationship with critical Muslim *American* studies—itself broadly conceptualized as a transnational and hemispheric discipline with a U.S. focus. In particular, I wish to decenter the place of the United States in the study of Islam in the Americas. Muslim and Islamic American studies cannot be defined as the study of twentieth- and twenty-first-

century Arab, South Asian, Persian, Turkish, West African, and other Muslim immigration to the United States and Canada, with its temporal pivot point as September 11, 2001, when the story of Muslims in the Americas began in the colonial era with enslaved Iberian-Maghrebi *Moriscos* and the transatlantic African slave trade.

There is significant controversy over some historians' recuperation of narratives of enslaved Caribbean African Muslims, because there are so few verifiable written records of them. Particularly in the case of Jamaica, Maureen Warner-Lewis notes issues with historiographic scholarly works by Sultana Afroz that read as though they challenge Caribbean historical scholarship with the political agenda of "the promotion of Islam," utilizing "extravagance of assertion, leaps in assumptions, and glib transitions from probability to dogmatism," as well as "attribution of causation to the conjuncture or correlation of event, behaviour or custom."[25] That is to say, all scholars write from their own biases, but some recurring assertions, for example that Jamaican Maroons lived in mostly Muslim communities, are stretches unsupported by data or literature. This book revolves around finding the elided Muslim in Caribbean history and literature, and I have significant personal and academic sympathy for that cause; but the missing Muslim in the archive cannot be produced simply by desire. As such, I agree with Warner-Lewis and have omitted seemingly shaky historiographies from my research—though I have noted some of the texts bibliographically.

Much of Caribbean studies and Caribbean literature, including the Indo-Caribbean literature that provides one gateway into the lives of regional Muslims, has been concerned with questions of trauma, loss, and recuperation—an inevitability given the depredations, displacement, and suffering caused by African slavery and, later, Indian indentureship. The recovery of Africa, for example, was a central artistic and political concern of the pan-Africanist Négritude movement of the 1930s—a movement spearheaded by Francophone Afro-Caribbean intellectuals including Martinican Aimé Césaire and French Guianese Léon Damas. Indo-Caribbean literature also begins with the varied positioning of ancestral India as lost, never-lost, or always in a process of recovery, and in the Naipaulian tradition, by fixing the Indo-Caribbean person as mimic man or permanent exile. The primary subject of Indo-Caribbean studies and literature, as identified by Miriam Pirbhai, Sean Lokaisingh-Meighoo, Peggy Mohan, Brinda Mehta, and others, is the *jahaji bhai* or *jahaji bahin*, "ship brother" or "ship sister," the familial, fraternal shipboard relationship of indentured Indians, whose subjectivity is formed by the rupture from India and the geocultural loss of caste and culture caused, in nineteenth-century Hinduism, by the physical act of crossing the *kala pani*, the "black water" of the ocean. Mourning, recuperation, and a preoccupation with the intersections of the remnants of "lost" ancestral cultures with European imperialist legacies are central to Caribbean postcoloniality. I adhere to Gayatri Spivak's vision of subaltern studies in which "a nostalgia for lost origins

can be detrimental to the exploration of social realities within the critique of imperialism."[26] This is not a project of nostalgia or traumatic loss.

I take the foundational position that *the Caribbean Muslim exists, and is both Caribbean and Muslim*. This is a necessary statement in light of the gross generalization of the touristic "Caribbean" ethos as one involving sun, sand, sex, reggae, revelry, and rum—the opposite of the generalization of the straitlaced, pious Muslim. The assertion that a Caribbean Muslim subjectivity exists is also a response to the deep identitarian and existential insecurity, and internalized racial and cultural self-hatred, of some postcolonial Caribbean literature, writers, scholarship, and national discourse. To wit, as Naipaul said in *his* 2001 Nobel Prize in Literature lecture, his choices of subject are the "areas of darkness" that surrounded him as a child in Trinidad, a place where people "inquired about nothing," were "not yet capable of self-assessment," and were "perhaps not pretending, perhaps only feeling, never formulating it as an idea—that [they] had brought a kind of India with us."[27] Of Trinidad Muslims Naipaul recalls not Walcott's soaring minaret, but a ramshackle shop run by a man called Mian, of whom Naipaul knew naught else but his name, as "We knew nothing of Muslims," and "This idea of strangeness, of the thing to be kept outside, extended even to other Hindus."[28] Religion as an unpleasant "strangeness" is a recurring theme of Naipaul's. His is the project of recovery and identification of the past, and critique of the inadequate present. Walcott's is the future-oriented but nostalgic project of recognition of the historical expanse. My project is neither; I identify the Caribbean Muslim fullaman as both *a literary and a political subject*. While recuperative historicizing is contextually necessary, I am more concerned with the ongoing and shifting positionality of Caribbean Muslims—whom I take as a diverse but established presence—in contemporary narratives of, first, Caribbean citizenship, and second, global Islam.

Caribbean fiction writers including Willi Chen, David Dabydeen, Brenda Flanagan, Wilson Harris, Ismith Khan, Rooplall Monar, Sheik Sadeek, Ryhaan Shah, and Jan Lowe Shinebourne; poets including Faizal Deen, Abdur-Rahman Slade Hopkinson, and Rajiv Mohabir; autobiographers including Munshi Rahman Khan, Muhammad Kabā Saghanughu, and Abū Bakr al-Siddīq; and many calypsonians and musicians have all contributed to a canon of Muslim Caribbean literature and lyricism. Here I acknowledge, as have ethnomusicologists of the Caribbean, including Mark Brill, Peter Manuel, Tejaswini Niranjana, and Tina K. Ramnarine, that music remains an integral part of community self-identification and formation in the Caribbean, including—despite the fact that some Muslims frown on music and dance—for Caribbean Muslims. From medieval Sufis to contemporary Indonesia and Iran, there are centuries' worth of debate from every major Muslim society, sect, and school on the permissibility of various types of music (the possible irony is that the Arab, Asian, African, and Eurasian societies that are majority Muslim have extremely rich, complex, and alive indigenous music and dance traditions, and are at the forefront of global fusion music).[29] Muslims

who believe that all or some music is *harām* (prohibited) generally do so on the basis of *hadīth*, and *fiqh* juridical reasoning on the Prophet Muhammad's intent concerning the emotional and morally actionable effects of playing musical instruments and singing (instrumentation and vocalization are often treated separately). The Qur'an has nothing explicit to say about music, though some scholars argue that a Qur'anic reference to the pitfalls of idle talk and entertaining speech in the form of "distracting tales," as opposed to mindful Qur'anic recitation, is a reference to music.[30] I suggest, however, that even without reference to the musical inclinations of Sufi dervishes and mystics, Islam in practice is suffused with music. The aforementioned recitation and traditional chanting of the Qur'an, which is written in classical Arabic rhyming verse, is an internationally competitive high art form called *tajwīd* (elocution). Even the grotesque martyrdom videos of one of the greatest of contemporary Islamic music-haters and ironically professional media producers—the Islamic State—are often accompanied by a cappella *nasheeds* (devotional chants) that function as liturgical background music. In the Caribbean, the first Trinidadian recordings of "sacred Mohammedan chants," Moulood Sharif songs for the Prophet's birthday, were also the first recordings of Indo-Caribbean music, performed by vocalists S. M. Akberali and Gellum Hossein and recorded by the American Victor Talking Machine Company in Trinidad in 1914.[31] Limitations on music, as I will show, remain an unpopular idea among the majority of Muslims in the Caribbean.

THE CARIBBEAN MUSLIM FULLAMAN: FROM ENSLAVED WEST AFRICAN TO INDENTURED INDIAN

From the West African tribal name Fula/Fulani/Fulbe, "fullaman" in Anglophone British Guiana once literally meant an enslaved "Fula man"; but in contemporary common usage, it is a mildly insulting slang word for a Muslim of any race.[32] The similarly derived term "Mandingo" or "Madinga," from Mandé/Mandinka, occupies the same linguistic and social place in Trinidad: an African tribal name that now denotes any Muslim. I use the Guyanese term because, unlike "Mandingo," which has a number of non-Caribbean contemporary associations, including the African tribal group and, derogatorily, a sexualized black man, "fullaman" is a word that evolved in the Caribbean and has no contemporary associations other than "Muslim." In addition, the word without question now indicates a Muslim of any ethnic background. As such, I extend it to indicate any Muslim in the Caribbean.

I have noted that "fullaman" can be used in an insulting manner. It does not reach the extremity of an ethnic slur. I make this assertion as a person against whom the word has been deployed in the Caribbean, and who grew up around its regular usage by Muslims and non-Muslims. My project here is not to politically recuperate or rehabilitate the word for Caribbean Muslims, but rather to explore it and extend its meaning. This is a different goal than that of Gaiutra

Bahadur, David Dabydeen, Rajiv Mohabir, Rajkumari Singh, and Khal Torabully, who have in various ways sought to recover the labor-based racial slur for Indians in the Caribbean and other diasporic regions of indentureship, "coolie."[33] Indeed, many Indo-Caribbean people, particularly youths in the North American diaspora, already use "coolie" freely in speech and music without the benefit of academic discourse. To my knowledge, there are no other scholars or writers engaging with recuperation or deep exploration of the word "fullaman," which is far more obscure than "coolie," and perhaps more difficult to quantify. "Coolie" is a dysphemism and "fullaman" a cacophemism. The latter definition allows for a humorous tone to the slur; "fullaman" can be deployed in affectionate or biting jest by Muslims and non-Muslims, and when it is used as a religious insult, the sting is less than with the racist use of "coolie." In my experience, "fullaman" is indeed used jokingly, but in a spectrum of Anglophone Caribbean wit and jokery that ranges from affection to stinging criticism and dismissal. Both Muslims and non-Muslims tend to use "fullaman" when they criticize Muslims for being *too* Muslim (i.e., for being too religious or manifesting the visual, mostly sartorial signifiers of Islam in public in a way that compromises belonging in the "Western" Caribbean postcolonial nation-state). None of this is to say that the word should be easily spoken in a scholarly context without specifying its local usages and history. But it is an instructive term for Islam in the Caribbean.

The etymology of "fullaman" is complex and full of suppositions. The Fulani and the Mandinka are linguistically discrete and very large ethnic groups with many subgroups that overlap across West Africa and the Sahel. The majority of members of both groups are historically Muslim. The Fulani are divided into discrete urban and pastoral groups, with the *gidah*/Toroodbe "town Fulani" leading several West African eighteenth- and nineteenth-century *jihāds* to establish anticolonial Islamic theocracies across West Africa. The Fulani call themselves Fulbe, and were named "Fulani," the more widely used term in and outside Africa, by the Hausa.[34] It is not implausible that the Hausa would have called one of their closest neighbors in and around Nigeria the Arabic-language equivalent of "those men." The Hausa are also Muslim, and the use of Arabic as a liturgical, governmental, and commercial language across Muslim West Africa has a history spanning ten centuries. The Arabic word فُلان (*fulān*), meaning "so-and-so" or "what's-his-name," occurring in the storytelling name Sayyid Fulan or "Mister X," has cognates with similar meaning in languages including Persian and Turkish, and has lent itself to the Spanish and Portuguese term *fulano*, meaning "this man" or "that guy," picturesquely used in Latin American, Spanish Caribbean, and European Spanish colloquial formulations like "Fulano, Mengano, y Zutano" (Tom, Dick, and Harry), and "fulano de tal" (John Doe). The dictionary of the Real Academia Española cites the origin term *fulān* as having even older roots in Ancient Egypt, and there are possible cognates in Aramaic and at least one use of the word in the Qur'an: the symbolic polytheist wrongdoer, regretting his actions on the

Day of Judgment, cries: "Woe is me! If only I had not taken *so and so* as a friend" (emphasis added).[35] "Fula-" is a self-reflexive term for the Other that has conservatively retained form and meaning across time and place: it denotes "that one over there," a proximal person whose name is unknown and whose affiliation may be distrusted. Though the term is present in both the Anglophone Caribbean and the Hispanophone/Lusophone Caribbean, in the former—because it was indirectly introduced by the African Muslim people called Fulani—it has come to mean "Muslim," rather than signifying an unknown person. I suggest, however, that the implicit meaning of "someone else" is still present in the application of "fullaman" to *any* Muslim in Guyana and the Caribbean.

It is impossible to determine how many African Muslims were enslaved in the Americas. As Diouf, Rudolph Ware, Ivor Wilks, and others show, from the fifteenth century onward, male and female literacy and Qur'anic literacy were highly valued in the Muslim theocracies of West Africa. Enslaved people from Timbuktu (Mali) and Futa Jallon (Guinea), for example, were likely Muslims who read and wrote in both Arabic and *'ajamī*, the generic name for West African languages, including Fulani and Hausa, that were transliterated into Arabic script.[36] Islamic schools, *madrassas*, were and are widespread in West Africa. Ware argues that Islam must be understood as "an integral and authentic part of the African historical experience," one in which the often-Sufi West African religious approach was an *embodied* practice in which knowledge and deeds, following the examples of the Prophet Muhammad's life, were considered inseparable.[37] The Jamaican singer Tijani Concious's spiritual mentor Baay Ibrahim Niasse was one of four West African scholarly founders of, says Zachary Wright, "the largest Muslim communities in West African history. Together, they command the allegiance of a majority of Muslims in the region to this day—and are at least partly responsible for the continued flourishing of Sufism in Africa when it has sometimes become marginalized elsewhere in the Muslim world."[38] The other West African Muslim community–founding scholars are Ahmadu Bamba, 'Umar Tai, and 'Uthman bin Fudi or Dan Fodio, founder of the Sokoto Empire, the largest state in nineteenth-century sub-Saharan Africa, spanning modern-day Nigeria, Niger, and Chad.[39] Dan Fodio, as I will discuss further in the first chapter of this book, was a politician who led with scholarly literary and spiritual writings. Baay Niasse wrote specifically of how in *Bilād as-Sūdān*, the historical Arabic denotation of "Lands of the Blacks," "poetry and love for the Prophet were something special by which black African Muslims had demonstrated their scholarly authority in Islam."[40] West African Islam has always been in close conversation with Middle Eastern Arab and Asian Islam, but Baay Niasse here emphasizes its particular history of literacy and embodiment of the Prophetic example.

Accordingly, African Muslims distinguished themselves partly by their literacy in the Americas. The academic study of enslaved African Muslims in the Americas often focuses on two Afro-Muslim communities and incidents: the Malê

Revolt, an 1835 African Muslim uprising during Ramadan in Bahia, Brazil, that was the largest slave rebellion in the Americas; and the legacy of enslaved West African Bilali Muhammad, his descendants, and his Gullah Muslim community on Sapelo Island, off the Georgia coast of the United States. Both sets of Muslims have what most other enslaved Africans lacked: existing documentation of their origins written in their own hands. The Malês in Brazil were numerous enough to hold informal Islamic schools to teach Arabic and the Qur'an. The U.S. Bilali Muhammad Document, or the Ben Ali Diary, is Muhammad's still-existing handwritten treatise on West African Islamic law. In the Caribbean and North America, racial typologizing of Africans combined with Muslim literacy produced in white plantation society a belief that the Fulani and Mandinka were racially superior by dint of their alleged straighter hair, "less glossy black" skin, and proposed North African/Iberian Moorish Arab admixture.[41] Gomez reports the case of British Jamaican planter Bryan Edwards, who wrote in 1794 of his slaves knowing the "Alcoran," and who considered the Muslim Fulani racially superior to other Africans, and therefore "not well adapted for hard labour."[42] Such attitudes sometimes resulted in better treatment for enslaved African Muslims on plantations. Diouf writes that Muslims "distinguished themselves among the rest of the enslaved population more frequently than their numbers alone could have warranted. There is some indication that the Muslims succeeded in the slave structure, that they were promoted and trusted in a particular way."[43] These "successes" belonged to men. The historical record of black Muslims in the Americas consists primarily of planter and administrative references to and fragments of writing by enslaved and free African Muslim men. There are almost no records of enslaved African Muslim women, and none extant in their own voices. As I will show in the first chapter, rather than religion or the strength of religious belief itself, it is literacy, and planters' racist beliefs in the inherent superiority of the "Arab" African over the sub-Saharan African, that were key to some Muslim men's modest successes in plantation societies.

Europeans conceived of enslavement as the entrée of the premodern "cannibal" Carib and "savage" African into a biopolitical modernity that construed them as labor by stripping them of the human ability to reason.[44] Fullaman African Muslims and their relationship to literacy and a literary religious practice troubled this vision of voiceless Caliban that encompassed the indigenous, all Africans, and at times in the Caribbean, Europeans considered nonwhite, like Portuguese indentured laborers. Educated African Muslims could not fit comfortably into the linear grand narrative of racialized "progress" framed by European superiority. "Fullaman," Muslim, is a state of exception that exists in what I will borrow from Trinidadian calypso and describe in the fourth chapter as "Muslim time": a construct of state emergency that may inevitably be the rule, as Walter Benjamin points out, but at the very least teaches us that "Muslim" is always a racialized, nonlinear temporal category.[45]

"Fullaman" has thus outlasted the tribal "Fulani" as an ethnoreligious identity in Guyana by almost 200 years. It survived by waiting for new Muslims to begin arriving in 1838, and attaching itself to them, as enslaved African Muslims left no Guyanese Muslim descendants. The first ships transporting Indian indentured laborers to the Caribbean, the *Whitby* and the *Hesperus*, which both reached British Guiana from Calcutta on May 5, 1838, carried 94 Muslim passengers, 3 of whom were adult women, out of a total of 424 migrants.[46] The *Whitby* also transported the first Caribbean Indian Muslim convert to Christianity: one Nertha Khan, who opportunistically converted soon after landing in Guiana to curry colonial administrative favor, as Indian Christian converts were looked upon more favorably than the majority who remained Hindu or Muslim.[47]

The bodily signifiers of Islam in the Caribbean are almost entirely sartorial, but the raiment has changed. Until the 1990s, "Muslim" garments consisted mostly of "Indian" dress: at religious and "cultural" functions, Indo-Caribbean Muslim women wore and still wear *salwar kameez,* and loosely covered their heads to distinguish themselves from sari-wearing Hindus—though older Indian women of both religions wore *ohrnis* draped around their heads for reasons of modesty. A Muslim man might wear a *kufi* (skullcap) and a long, loose *kurta* shirt. Nowadays, Muslim Caribbean dress also includes, for men, the option to wear an Arab *thobe* and cultivate what Muslims around the globe, sometimes darkly, sometimes humorously, refer to as a "Salafi beard," a long beard sans mustache that can symbolize patriarchy, political conservatism, strict adherence to the *hadīth* sayings of the Prophet that advise not trimming the beard, or just generic Muslim. For women, the new, more conservative options include modern *hijabs* (or *khimar* in Guyana, headscarves that often have a second, inner, hair-covering piece), *niqabs* (full-face veils), and *chador* cloaks. It is a relatively new phenomenon to see Muslims dressed "Arab style" in the Caribbean, and, as I will discuss in the fourth and fifth chapters, not everyone is happy with this change.

Urdu is Indo-Caribbean Muslims' traditional liturgical language, outlasting in children's religious educational *madrassa* (a place for studying) and *maktab* (a place of writing) schools its spokenness, but it has been replaced by Arabic in those schools over the course of the twentieth century.[48] I learned strictly the Arabic alphabet and religious terms at my Georgetown, Guyana Sunni Sad'r Islamic Anjuman madrassa (see fig. I.1) in the 1980s and 1990s, whereas my mother's generation learned the Urdu alphabet and a mix of Urdu and Arabic Islamic terms in Georgetown in the 1960s.[49] We girls were moved away from sitting on the same floor as boys and lost access to more highly trained male Islamic teachers in the late 1980s, when young Guyanese men educated in Egypt and the Gulf returned to their home mosques with Islamic revivalist ideas. The linguistic shift is perhaps more inevitable than the change in dress for two reasons: except in Suriname, the majority of Indo-Caribbean people have not spoken their ancestral languages for at least three or four generations, depending on when their families

FIGURE 1.1 Guyana United Sad'r Islamic Anjuman Masjid and author's childhood madrassa. Kitty, Georgetown, 2018. (HAM Photo Services.)

migrated, and the revealed language and encouraged study language of the Qur'an is classical Arabic.[50]

ISLAM, CREOLIZATION, AND HYBRIDITY

The *difference* that Caribbean Islam—envisioned by most Caribbean people as a religion of indentured Indians—has traditionally posed to the Caribbean, that postcolonial space par excellence of creolization and hybridity, is one of a particularity ontologically identifiable in two ways by what it is not: first, it is not Hindu, and second, and more importantly, it is not black. Neither of these defining attributes, particularly the latter, is accurate. The *Ramleela* of Walcott's observation represents not only Hinduism but the entirety of the Indo-Caribbean. Caribbean Muslims are first represented in the historical record by the colonial British as a subset of Indian/Hindu, first as "Hindoo" without distinction, then as "Mahometan Hindoo," and sometimes as "Mussulman."[51] Alexander Rocklin argues that Hinduism did not become a collective religious construct until comparatively quantified by British colonial authorities, Christian missionaries, and Indian elites in the nineteenth century in India, and that correspondingly, "Hinduism in Trinidad was discursively produced and performatively enacted with urgency and fervor by a range of actors beginning only in the early twentieth century."[52] Islam cohered differently in different places but usually around at least an idea—if not practice—of monotheism, belief in the Prophet Muhammad's importance, and the text of the Qur'an itself; as I will show, some enslaved Afri-

can Muslims certainly thought of themselves as Muslim followers of a religion called Islam, and indentured Indian Muslims, though mostly unlettered, sought to build mosques and find knowledgeable imams who knew enough Qur'an to lead them in ritual prayer from early on in their Caribbean colonial history. Even before a drive toward unification of religious practice, Hindus, it must be noted, also sought pandits and built *kutias*, small places of worship, on the plantations. As Peter van der Veer and Steven Vertovec observe, "Hindus may not need caste, but even in the case of the West Indies they seem to need Brahmans as their religious specialists"—perhaps *especially* in the case of the West Indies, as Brahmins, like plantation and village imams, provided religious legitimacy and structure in places where there was little to no state or social validation of Hinduism and Islam.[53]

The most important historical Indo-Caribbean group identifier is not religion but race and the seeming purity thereof: "Indianness" posed in opposition to both "Africanness" and mixed-race "Creoleness." As Henry argues, Caribbean creolization is coterminous with the forces of Old World African, Asian, and Arab "purisms" in an oscillating "pure/creole binary" that never reconciles or resolves.[54] In popular regional conception, national discourses of citizenship, and Indo-Caribbean academic analysis, the postcolonial group identity "Indo-Caribbean" is extrapolated through moral judgments of women's roles and behavior that are conceptualized in large part through Hinduism. As Sherry-Ann Singh has argued and I will discuss in the second chapter, all Indo-Caribbean women are subject to the Ramayanic Sita ideal of the faithful Indian wife and mother.[55] Caribbean Hindus and Muslims also often intermarry and participate in each other's familial and neighborly religious occasions, including the historic celebration of Hosay.

The vast majority of the Indo-Caribbean is indeed Hindu, adhering to both the traditional Sanatan Dharma, with the significant Caribbean difference of the historical breakdown of caste divisions, and to the reformist, anticaste, monotheistic Indian Arya Samaj movement. Strict caste strictures could not be maintained, nor were they particularly desired, on the ships of indenture or on plantations, when the Indian migrant population was relatively small and heavily derived from *ahir* (cowherd), *chamar* (leatherworker), and other laboring castes of Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Punjab, Lahore, a few other north and northwestern Indian regions, and Madras in the south. Indentureship contracts and embarkation and disembarkation registers listed each contractee's caste and subcastes, but most migrants were illiterate. It is an old running joke in the Caribbean that many were the newly minted, self-declared Brahmins who emerged from British ships onto the shores of Guiana and Trinidad, seeking opportunity. The large number of Indian laborers brought to French Guadeloupe and Martinique are now predominantly Catholic and have diverged in culturally and demographically significant ways from their Anglophone and Néerlandophone brethren. Hinduism, in its Caribbean noncaste form, became emblematic of the large

historic Indo-Caribbean populations in Trinidad, Guyana, and Suriname, and smaller communities in Jamaica, Grenada, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, and other islands. As I argue, however, the Caribbean Muslim subject is not fixed as a racial-religious Indian.

Both Afro- and Indo-Caribbean communities find themselves in the position of defining their postcolonial identities as "native" when they are not autochthonous to the Caribbean: the aforementioned problem of Caliban's elision of the indigenous. Afro- and Indo-Caribbean people must become "native" in order to prove their sovereign rights to land of which they are not the original inhabitants, in such a way as to also revoke the claim of the colonizer. Shona Jackson calls this particularly Caribbean nativization, which occurs at the expense of indigenous tribal peoples who still live in Dominica, Guyana, and other continental American locales, "creole indigeneity."[56] Munasinghe argues that in Trinidad, Creoles—a category that conflates Afro-Caribbeans with people who are racially mixed but never only Indo-Caribbean—are through a narrative of mythicizing "impurity" produced as rightful inheritors of the postcolonial island.[57]

Hybridity and creolization are sometimes used loosely and interchangeably in Caribbean literary and national discourses, but they are different ways of conceptualizing the "mixing" of peoples and cultures. José Martí in 1891 begins a discussion of Caribbean and Latin American hybridity as a counterpoint to monocultural "authenticity" in "nuestra América Mestiza."[58] Retamar in 1979 describes Caribbean and Latin American hybridity as exceptionalist, arguing that revolution and decolonization in "nuestra América Mestiza" would only be successful if the colonized identify as mestizo (racially "mixed").[59] In its Latin American guise, hybridity insufficiently describes the Anglophone Caribbean for at least two reasons: the vast majority of the latter's people do not identify as mestizo or mixed-race, and they are likely to take umbrage at the idea that they possess a history and cultural practices that do not privilege ties to Africa or India. The British strategy of colonization in the Caribbean also did not include major European settlement and racial intermixing; in the region, theirs was an overseas empire.[60] This system of colonial governance is different from that practiced in the settler colonies of Hispanophone and Lusophone Latin America, where theories of Caribbean hybridity and creolization originate. Rather than hybridity, Shalini Puri says, a multiplicity of local concepts of mixing, including "*mestizaje*, creolization, douglarization, *jibarismo* . . . keep visible the specificities and histories of each term. In contrast, the umbrella term 'hybridity' enacts a dehistoricizing conflation."[61] "Creolization" is a broader term than most of the others. In Trinidad, its usage is specific to mixed-race and Afro-Trinidadian "Creole" identity, as Munasinghe describes, but the word's earliest Latin American and Caribbean application was to colonial whites born in the Americas.[62] In the context of religion, syncretism is a type of creolization, signifying "the malleability and mutability of various beliefs and practices as they adapt to new understandings of class, race, gender,

power, labor, and sexuality," and "is one of the most significant phenomena in Caribbean religious history."[63] The term "creolization" is overdetermined in the Caribbean. The fullaman of Caribbean literature, I show, is a figure who experiences the *process of creolization*, in that the Muslim in the Caribbean contends with a host of cultural traditions, political ideologies, and religious theologies, but who does not become a fully hybridized, creolized Americas "native" who is the sum of his parts. Instead, the Muslim literary fullaman experiences an ongoing, antiessentialist process of becoming in response to local and global pressures.

THE MUSLIM "RACE(S)" AND HOSAY

From medieval and Crusader depictions of the monstrous Saracen idolater, to nineteenth-century orientalist paintings of women in Ottoman harems, to contemporary media representations of turbaned terrorists, Muslims and Islam have always been racialized by Europeans and their white North American cultural inheritors. Racialized Muslims, embodied by the amorphously brown-skinned, vaguely "Middle Eastern" man and his veiled female counterpart, have become a regular feature of the global mediascape after September 11, 2001. Evelyn Alsultany, Mustafa Bayoumi, Sylvester Johnson, Erik Love, Rana, and others have written about the racialization of Muslims in the United States and abroad. As Rana says,

> Race is tied to terror and migration precisely through the conjuring of an enemy. The foe is defined in relation not only to democracy and freedom but also to the moral precepts of the ideologically motivated formation of a Christian subject that argues for just war as an obligation of secularity and imperialism. That this enemy is crafted as a religious entity, albeit a radically militant one, does not obscure the racial nature of the construction. . . . The figures of the terrorist and the migrant are woven together in the figure of "the Muslim" as a racial type; as such, they are historically, ethnologically, and contemporaneously bound to each other.[64]

As Muslims are always racialized enemies of the state, they fit neatly into Johnson's definition of race in the African American religious milieu as "a state practice of ruling people within a political order that perpetually places some within and others outside of the political community through which the constitution of the state is conceived."[65] Bayoumi writes that "Religion determines race. At least in 1942," when, in December 1942—during World War II and after the Immigration Acts of 1917 and 1924 that enforced bans and quotas on migration from Asia and other "nonwhite" regions—Yemeni Muslim immigrant Ahmed Hassan lost his petition for citizenship in Michigan District Court on the basis of his "dark brown" color.[66] The vicious conflation of religion and race and the imputed questionable social and citizenship status of Arabs and Muslims is ongoing. Ethnic Arabs and the phenotypically brown-skinned people mistaken for them, religious

Muslims, and an imagined geography of the "Middle East" that reaches into Asia, Africa, and immigrant neighborhoods in Europe and North America, constitute an enduring nexus of orientalist orientation coded generically as "Muslim." Simply put, 9/11 was hardly the first engagement of Europe or the United States with the "otherness" of the Muslim. The current moment of hysteria over the specter of the Muslim is partly a result of the fact that, in a world of around-the-clock news reporting, social media, easy intercontinental travel, and intensive technological surveillance of the public, there is, especially in the case of Muslim women who are often called upon to represent all Muslims because of their identifying hijabs, simply more coverage. Media images and surveillance of Muslims in the United States and Europe remain racialized: Louise Cainkar and Sunaina Maira write of "flying while Muslim" and the racial profiling and criminalization of Muslim travelers; Alsultany identifies film, television, and news "simplified complex representations" of Muslims that masquerade as "post-race," but in fact justify racist and exclusionist policies by conflating all Muslims and Arabs.[67] Jasbir Puar further complicates the U.S. racialization of Muslims by pointing out that post-9/11, "Muslim = Islam = Arab. Religion, in particular Islam, has now supplanted race as one side of the irreconcilable binary between queer and something else."[68] In Puar's homonationalist United States, normative queerness is incompatible with the racial Other, but also the religious Other: the very existence of queer Muslims becomes irreconcilable with both queer Western secularity and the historical vastness that is Islamic theology.

Describing Muslims in racialized terms is not a phenomenon limited to the United States and other countries with growing populations of migrant Muslims. Muslims arrived in visible numbers in the Caribbean at the same time as they did in the United States, with the transatlantic slave trade. In Trinidad and Guyana, the countries with near-even numbers of Afro- and Indo-Caribbean people, Muslims have passed through, as I will explore, at least three stages of racial-religious conflation. First, during the transatlantic slave trade, African Muslims of all tribes and cultures were deemed fullaman (Guyana) or Mandingo (Trinidad). Second, from the nineteenth century to the 1990s, the common belief in both countries was that all Muslims were Indian, and Islam was part of an Indian ethnocultural heritage; and third, contemporary national discourses suggest that while all "born" Muslims are still Indo-Caribbean, there are more Afro-Caribbean converts now, and both groups are prone to national and transnational violence.

There is one exceptional historical case of Islamic religious creolization in the Caribbean: Walcott's "festival of Husein," or Hosay. In the nineteenth century, indentured Muslim Indians in Trinidad, Guiana, Jamaica, and Suriname transformed the Shi'a subcontinental and Persian commemoration of Muharram into the festival of Hosay, Hussay, Tadjah, or Taziya (see figs. I.2 and I.3). In Mauritius, another major site of the Indian labor diaspora, the transplanted Muharram processional festival is called Yamsé.[69] According to Mohammed, "The earliest

FIGURE 1.2 Hussay East Indian Muslim festival with *tadjah* model tombs and diverse participants and spectators in colonial Westmoreland, Jamaica. (Courtesy of the National Library of Jamaica.)

FIGURE 1.3 Hosay procession on Hayes Street, St. Clair, heading west into St. James in Port of Spain, Trinidad. From left to right: Ghulam Hussein, Balma, and Bis *tadjahs*, accompanied by *tassa* drummers and spectators. December 17, 2010. (Courtesy of Nicholas Laughlin.)

observance of Hosay in Trinidad has been traced to 1854, eleven years after the first set of indentured laborers arrived from India."[70] Hosay was—and is, in its remaining historic bastions of St. James and Cedros in Trinidad, and in revived festivities elsewhere—a multiday religious celebration featuring a public procession of large and small model tombs (*tadjahs*), a red model of the crescent moon and a green model of the moon representing the brothers Hussein and Hasan, respectively, flags, singing, dancing, drumming, and, in earlier days, stick-fighting (*gatcar*) and fire dancing (fire pass).[71] The *tadjahs* are carried toward a mythic, extranational "Karbala" and usually into the sea to be submerged—a gesture sometimes criticized as "Hindu," though Mohammed points out that the submergence "symboliz[es] both the violence of this moment in Islamic history and the transience of life."[72]

It was of especial concern to colonial authorities in the Caribbean that Hosay was one of the few times and spaces in which blacks and Indians, who were pitted against each other in the colonial labor economy, congregated and celebrated together.[73] In Trinidad, Hosay belonged to all Trinidadians even more than did the *Ramleela*. Though "an ostensibly Muslim ritual commemoration, [it] was the only 'Indian' holiday Trinidadian laborers officially had off from work, regardless of religious identification."[74] As Bridget Brereton says, Hosay "became the major Indian festival in Trinidad. It soon lost its special religious meaning as a commemorative rite . . . and became almost entirely secular. Most of the participants were Hindus, not Moslems, and Creoles participated enthusiastically until 1885."[75] Afro-Caribbean people found Hosay's street festival aspect familiar and "began to take a more respectable part in the procession as drummers for which they were paid in rum or cash," and sometimes carried the *taziyas*.[76] Rocklin points to the fact that even the first novel of Indo-Guiana, the anti-indenture English lawyer and politician John Edward Jenkins's 1877 colonial romance *Lutchmee and Dilloo: A Study of West Indian Life*, describes the Tadjah festival.[77] Jenkins, who observed Tadjah upon his visit to the colony to report upon the living conditions of the indentured, wrote that the festival often erupted in violence that caused planters to demand its prohibition, and that "Corresponding to the Mohammedan Feast of the Mohurrun, in India, it is nevertheless but a hybrid and foreign imitation of it. All the Coolies, of whatever denomination, join in celebrating it, as a sort of holiday, or rather of carnival."[78] Creolized religious culture, in this colonial moment, was a "hybrid and foreign imitation" of legitimate Old World religious practice. Jenkins was also savvy enough to describe an indentured Indian Sepoy soldier named Ramsammy—some Sepoys were forcibly relocated to the colonies after mutinying against the British East India Company in 1857—as "at best a Wahabee, wild and violent."[79] Here Jenkins demonstrates his worldly orientalist awareness of goings-on in the farthest reaches of Empire, namely the eighteenth-century development of Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab's puritanical Islamic Wahhabism and his collusion with the political aims of Muhammad ibn Saud,

progenitor of the House of Saud, that eventually led to the unification of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932. In 1877, the Muslim in the Caribbean was already associated with religious violence stemming from the Arabian Peninsula that gave birth to Islam, and even the Hindu Sepoy Ramsammy's anticolonial rebelliousness—all rebelliousness against Christian domains—was coded as Muslim.

Jenkins associates Hosay/Tadjah with carnival revelry. In Trinidad, says Korom, the festival became "carnivalized . . . so that it takes on aspects of observances occurring during periods of carnival in the Caribbean."[80] As such, it was a way for Indians to "participate in Creole culture, but they also reassert their own Indian ethnic identity by performing a tradition that is perceived to have come to Trinidad from India in an unaltered state."[81] David Wood, though, points out the differences between Hosay and Trinidad Lenten Carnival: while "revelry and uninhibited behavior," were a feature of both, "[t]he Saturnalian aspects of Carnival, the wearing of disguise, the assumption for two days pf the status and roles of other people, the mocking of the foibles and pretensions of the powers-that-be, were absent in Hosein."[82] Afro-Trinidadians were not the first non-Muslims to ever occupy the position of Hosay drummers: in India, Hindu *Chamar* were hired to play drums during Muharram processions.[83] Hindus also participated in Hosay in Trinidad.[84] Chamars are *Dalits*, so-called untouchables who traditionally occupied a position outside of the Hindu caste system, and as such may have been more likely to accept work in a Muslim religious celebration. Many Chamars migrated to the Caribbean as indentured laborers, so the idea that non-Muslims could serve as Hosay drummers was not forgotten.

Though the Indo-Muslim origins of the rite can be observed clearly in Trinidad, as Korom shows, the ritual performance went through a lengthy process of indigenization.[85] It is Caribbean, but Aisha Khan argues that it "may appear an opposite contrast to other Caribbean 'creole' or 'syncretic' religions, not the least reasons being the centrality of public performance (at the same time that the Muslim preparatory rituals connected to its culminating procession are considered sacred and hence restricted to observant Muslims); its possessing a name (it is one ritual situated within a recognized religion, Islam); its capacity to have participants who are not necessarily practitioners; and its written documentation in colonial Caribbean history, which has been more consistent than other religious traditions whose histories are significantly, or at times entirely, based on oral historiographies."[86] Hosay is a past challenge to Henry's Caribbean creolization-purity binary: Indian Muslims saw themselves as *participating in creole practices though reenacting their own purity*. Rather than hybridity, this singularity that exists comfortably within difference is the hallmark of Caribbean Islam, making Hosay a metonym of Caribbean Islam.

The working-class Afro-Caribbean transition from Hosay partygoer to participant was even more pronounced in colonial British Guiana, where Afro-Guianese

also began as festival porters and drummers, but then started up their own parallel Good Friday festival of Black Tadjah. Black Tadjah was a product of Afro-Guianese desires to "assert power and another excuse for rowdy behavior. . . . Others were attracted simply because of the spectacle and loudness of the event."[87] Simply gathering in the streets and celebrating was a challenge to colonial authority, as all Tadjah and Hosay participants undoubtedly understood. The British moved quickly to curtail the festival in the Caribbean.

Tadjah was suppressed in British Guiana with colonial Ordinance No. 16 of 1869, which stipulated that "No 'Tadjah' processions will be permitted to enter the precincts either of the city of Georgetown or of the town of New Amsterdam," and imposed a host of other restrictions on pain of imprisonment and hard labor.[88] As Georgetown was the country's capital and New Amsterdam its second-largest town—they are the places where blacks and Indians interacted most—that was the festival's first death knell in Guiana. In Trinidad, in an 1884 event that came to be known as the "Muharram Massacre," colonial police read the Riot Act to Hosay processions entering the town of San Fernando in defiance of an 1882 government ordinance, then opened fire on the defiant but unarmed crowd, killing 16 and wounding scores more.[89] These killings, not the 1882 ordinance—which was less restrictive than British Guiana's—were what signaled the decline of the festival and Afro-Trinidadian participation in Trinidad. What remained of Hosay in early twentieth-century Trinidad and Guiana after colonial restrictions and the "uncompromising hostility" directed toward the festival by Presbyterian missionaries, then fell out of favor with Sunni Muslims who looked down on the event's Shi'a origins, and the festive irreligiousness and alleged idolatry of *taziadari*, the model tomb procession.[90]

At its colonial height, Hosay was an intriguingly "flexible arena for interracial and interreligious participation," providing an early Muslim avenue for cultural exchange between black and Indian residents of the Caribbean.[91] The festival has undergone somewhat of an interethnic twentieth-century revival in Trinidad, as an adjunct celebration similar in mood to Carnival itself. Some Muslims still call Hosay "un-Islamic," while others still believe "Afro-Trinidadian participation has turned Hosay into a fete."[92] Michael Goring, an elder who has been building *tadjahs* in St. James since he was seven years old, and who was born into a Muslim family but became Anglican, bemoans that "the older heads have not taught the younger ones and the younger ones are doing it for show."[93] Contemporary perceptions of the festival vary, but as Khan describes, many non-Muslim Trinidadians do know that Hosay is a Muslim celebration, and can describe why, in general terms.[94] Muslims have lived in the Caribbean and been of the Caribbean for a long time; they have been an uncontested and visible part of the multicultural fabric of postcolonial Trinidad, Guyana, Suriname, and Jamaica.

PERFORMING THE GLOBAL CARIBBEAN MUSLIM

As political entities produced and sustained by creolized race and culture, Caribbean nation-states idealize their ability to incorporate and enfold all difference. Muslims are framed in Guyana as equal national participants, as evidenced by the fact that they, Hindus, and Christians have been allotted two public holidays each: Muslims get Youman Nabi (Mawlid an-Nabi, the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad) and Eid al-Adha; Hindus get Phagwah (Holi) and Diwali; and Christians—or really everyone, Guyana being a former British Anglican colony where people of all faiths engage in the festivities of Christian holidays—get Easter and Christmas. Schoolchildren are taught about the celebrations of each of the three major settler religions of the nation. Muslims, though, number far fewer than Hindus or Christians, and there are small numbers of adherents of other faiths, notably Obeah and Bahá'i, present. Unlike Trinidad, Guyana does not legally recognize Orisha, or any African-derived faiths; and indigenous Amerindian cosmologies rarely enter the discussion. Christianity in the Anglophone Caribbean also encompasses minority groups that are not mainstream Protestant (here the mainstream is mostly Anglicans, Lutherans, Methodists, Presbyterians, and Baptists): notably, Catholics, Jehovah's Witnesses, Seventh-day Adventists, and growing numbers of North American–missionized evangelicals.

The Caribbean capacity to encompass difference elides and flattens particularity, but the repressed returns in myriad ways. While the Muslim *presence* in the Caribbean is indisputable and acknowledged by most, Muslim *citizenship* in the Caribbean nation-state has not been equally uncontested. In the fourth chapter, I discuss the 1990 Muslimeen Islamic coup in Trinidad and court cases in Guyana in which the fitness of Muslims to be counted as citizens and the compatibility of Islam with Caribbean politics were called into question. These cases show that in the Caribbean, as elsewhere, Muslims are adjudged by their fellow citizens to be more visible and vociferous than their demographic numbers would suggest. Their religion seems to have an outsized impact on their politics, and they seem somehow more intense and extreme than other people in their ideological purity and conservatism. These traits appear incompatible with creole Caribbean citizenship, especially if one assumes the Caribbean is fundamentally a laid-back tourist destination. But the Caribbean barely conceals the festering wounds of slavery, and the majority of its inhabitants are, amidst their Carnival celebrations, religiously conservative and fairly patriarchal people: regardless of their specific faith or ethnicity, there is very little disagreement among members of the Anglophone Caribbean general public over issues that are considered simultaneously moral, social, and legislative—like homosexuality, marriage, abortion, and gender roles.[95] Sexual acts between men, for one, remain illegal under inherited colonial "buggery" statutes in most of the former British Caribbean colonies, with the

notable exceptions of the Bahamas (1991) and Trinidad (2018). Muslims, on the whole, are no more or less tolerant or engaged with social issues than other Caribbean people.

There are reasons why Muslims are perceived as "different" wherever they live in majority non-Muslim countries. It is not because they are natural extremists or even a different species of human being, as some Islamophobes suggest.[96] First, some Muslims are more visible because of their religious dress, especially when in the present day they pattern their clothing after traditional Saudi and Arabian Gulf garments. Second, the Islamic combination of holy book (Qur'an); the Prophet's and his *sahābah* companions' words and deeds by which one is to live one's life (*hadīth*); the *sunnah* traditional practices of the early Islamic community; multiple bodies of canonical legal opinions (*shari'a*) derived from centuries of *fiqh* jurisprudence; and varied regional traditions, together produce a recognizable common religious framework that nonetheless has no single authority, voice, or leader—there is, so to speak, no pope, or more accurately, no agreed-upon caliph. Frustratingly for some, no one source can with any legitimacy "speak for the Muslims" to explain, apologize, or temporize when world events involve Muslims. Third, the hajj pilgrimage to Mecca and other transnational engagement with the global ummah, the Muslim worldwide community, produces in 1.8 billion Muslims the sense of being part of a prescribed and named community even while they are extremely different in culture and religious practice. "Ummah" occurs sixty-two times in the Qur'an "in the sense of religious community, as well as instances where it means 'fixed term' . . . and communities of animals like unto human groups."[97] There is also "a chronological development of the meaning of *umma* from generic application to religious communities to a more focused reference to the emerging Muslim community," and "throughout Islamic history the *umma* has usually been thought to possess final authority (under God) with respect to overseeing the leadership of the Muslims. The consensus has favored a unified *umma* as an ideal that transcends a particular period's limitations and divisions. Colonialism's challenge instigated a great renewal of *umma* awareness among Muslims."[98] In the ideal ummah, language, culture, ethnicity, and even ideological and sectarian markers of difference would be irrelevant. Calling oneself a Muslim who believes in the Islamic *Shahādah* creed (for Sunnis, "There is no God but God. Muhammad is the [final] messenger of God") is the only technical requirement for ummah community entry. But one implication of the ummah overseeing its own leadership is that it can be invoked as a disciplining and regulatory body, a problem when some strains and cultures of Islam, from Sunnis to Saudis, occupy hegemonic positions.

The Caribbean is included in the reach of contemporary global Islam, which I define as the manifestations of the ummah in postmodernity that include the following:

- Mass voluntary and involuntary migrations and diasporas
- 24/7 Internet, social media, and other peer-to-peer digital connectivity
- "Tradition" and "modernity" framed as oppositional forces, with, as Khan points out, tradition representing "abiding customs that carry the force of unspoken law," and, as I will discuss, the heavily weighted Islamic principle of *bid'a* (innovation) determining which forms of modernity are allowable and which are not[99]
- A conflation of ethnicity with religion that reinscribes Edward Said's orientalist construct of "[brown] Islam versus the [white] West" by transforming "Muslim" into a racial category[100]
- What Jamaican-British theorist of cultural studies Stuart Hall calls "global mass culture," particularized for Muslims as the combination of English-privileging news-dissemination technologies and visually Islamized homogenization of cultural representation[101]
- The paradoxical concentration of capital in social, economic, and political forms that signify, again following Hall, a reactionary "return to the local" as a response to globalization[102]
- A global linking of Islam with contemporary political iterations of terrorism, fundamentalism, radicalism, extremism, and other -isms that are often used interchangeably and confusingly to denote religious conservatism and revivalism linked to the potential for the use of violence to achieve an ideological goal that is often viewed as anti-imperialist

Islam, like all diaspora religions spread beyond their origins, is a faith that is simultaneously local and global. In Trinidad, N. Fadeke Castor has similarly framed diasporic Ifá/Orisha religion as linked to global black internationalism in "transnational spiritual networks" that produce a multilayered, scalar "spiritual citizenship."[103] This is different from Caribbean Muslim belonging in a preexisting, theological ummah. But the models of Caribbean diasporic religion are teleologically related, as in both Caribbean Ifá/Orisha and Caribbean Islam, "National citizenship does not preclude or compete with spiritual citizenship; rather, it is one facet within the entanglement of belonging."[104] All Muslims orient themselves directly or indirectly toward Mecca. This global engagement poses a distinct difficulty for local citizenship formulations in non-Muslim-majority countries—though *not usually for Muslims themselves*, the majority of whom find their national and spiritual citizenships relatively compatible. It is mostly non-Muslim fellow citizens who question the state loyalty of Muslims. The real local-global difference ascribed to Islam, in the present moment, is the figuring of Muslims as a singular global group linked to antistate violence.

Muslims from the Anglophone Caribbean and Suriname occupy a unique local space within global Islam. They have become, Khan says, "*of* the West and not

simply *in* the West" (emphasis in original).[105] They are not "Westernized" Muslims or contemporary immigrant Muslims to the Americas or Europe. They are native, hemispheric American Muslims who nonetheless have a connection to the rest of the global ummah, with its geographic center in the Arab world, and retain yet other links to ancestral India or Africa. Caribbean countries' reach is not politically confined to the Americas. During the reign of the socialist Linden Forbes Sampson Burnham in Guyana from the 1960s to the 1980s, for example, Guyana, though geographically far away from Africa and India, established close diplomatic ties with the global Non-Aligned Movement of countries that viewed themselves as outside of Cold War divisions and European and North American concerns—and this, as I will discuss in the final chapter, is how Arab (Libyan) Muslim missionaries and proselytization first came to Guyana. Partly as a result of its own demographics, Burnham's Guyana viewed itself as an especially close ally of Jawaharlal Nehru in India and Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana. Caribbean Muslims are people with multiple origins and cultural points of reference (i.e., they are typical Caribbean people).

The Caribbean Muslim fullaman is usually depicted in Caribbean literature as a "cultural" Muslim who as a result of enslavement or indentureship knows very little about doctrinal Islam. The postcolonial question for the literary fullaman is inevitably whether, in a bid to avoid the fate of the "mimic man" imitator of colonial culture, he or she will choose creolized Caribbean culture or the religious Islamic "purity" that is associated either with the Arab world or with the same ancestral African and Indian origins creolization ironically invokes. This book reads the Afro- and Indo-Muslim Caribbean together to suggest that it is not necessary, in the Caribbean, to choose an origin or a future in any more than a temporarily strategically essential way. It is more necessary to acknowledge, know, and live with difference without fear.

Islam, Robert Young says, "was not a major preoccupation of postcolonial studies as a whole in its first twenty or so years of existence" (with the exception of Said's work), as the field of postcolonial studies was "[d]eveloped out of the secular tradition of Marxism, in which religion was deemed to merit little serious attention."[106] As such, "While an intense interest in postcolonial theory has developed in Islamic countries, in 2001 Islam was just as unreadable for most postcolonial theorists in the West as for everyone else."[107] This gap in the postcolonial theorization of Islam has been recently filled by the work of Sadia Abbas, Hadi Enayat, John Erickson, Anouar Majid, Esra Mirze Santesso, Salman Sayyid, and Jamie Scott, among others. Anticolonial liberation projects in the Muslim world have always engaged with Islam: witness the religiously oriented 1979 Iranian Revolution against a U.S.-backed monarchy, and Frantz Fanon's chronicling of the Algerian Muslim liberation war from France in *A Dying Colonialism* (1959) and *The Wretched of the Earth* (1961). Abbas asserts that, "according to the religious turn initiated by [Talal] Asad, literature has taken over the functions once

performed by religion and, at the same time, has targeted religion for criticism, indeed, for insult and parody. Even as literature continues to perform this category-confusing, attack-and-mirror maneuver, it is misunderstood as stably secular."[108] The Caribbean fiction, poetry, and music I discuss here are colonial or postcolonial, and decidedly not secular. Majid points out that "the term *secularism* cannot avoid its unmistakable cultural origins" in late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Enlightenment Europe as "a classical liberal philosophy whose goal was nothing less than the recalibration and redefinition of human morality to adjust it to a new social calculus that excluded traditional religious commitments (irrational as these might have been)."[109]

There is no reason why the literary and cultural production of the postcolonial Anglophone Caribbean need aspire to European secularism, which naturalizes "Christian" values as secular. Though adherence varies wildly, Caribbean people are steeped in Anglicanism, Lutheranism, Presbyterianism, Evangelism, Hinduism, Islam, Rastafarianism, and a host of syncretic Afro-Caribbean religions deriving from Catholicism and Yoruba, Kongo, and other sub-Saharan African religions. M. Jacqui Alexander, Brathwaite, Harris, Lorde, and other theorists and writers have long insisted on the importance of the sacred and the spiritual in Caribbean postcoloniality, with particular reference to the African diaspora. Alexander advocates for "pedagogies of the sacred" in which "the designation of the personal as spiritual need not be taken to mean that the social has been evacuated for a domain that is ineluctably private"; the benefits are that we "take the lives of primarily working-class women and men seriously, and it would move us away from theorizing primarily from the point of marginalization."[110] Walter Mignolo similarly acknowledges that in the project of decoloniality, "Secularization is not by itself a safe place . . . secular modernity has its own politics, which do not necessarily coincide with the needs, visions, and desires of everyone on the planet."[111] Secularism can be arrogant and neocolonial in its sometimes fearful dismissal of the way people in the postcolonies live their spiritual lives, and disingenuous in its blindness to its own Europeanness and Christianity. Saidiya Hartman says that "history is how the secular world attends to the dead."[112] Caribbean diasporic and indigenous peoples require a full historical and spiritual accounting of their dead and their living.

The interplay between religious knowledge, religious custom, national belonging, and global belonging is ever shifting, and performed differently by the same individuals at different times, in different social contexts. The fullaman is always becoming, nonstatic, cyclical, and resistant to permanent hybridization in the manner of the dominant temporal and spatial metaphors of Caribbean *nature-culture*: Brathwaite's tidalectics, which rejects Hegelian dialectical synthesis in favor of "the movement of the water backwards and forwards as a kind of cyclic . . . motion, rather than linear"; Édouard Glissant's submerged "submarine roots," which "float . . . free, not fixed in one position in some primordial spot, but extending in all

directions in our world through its network of branches"; Harris's "limbo gateway" of the Middle Passage; and Marina Carter and Torabully's diasporic "coolitude" of labor diasporas.[113] There is drift and recall, ebb and flow, in the often-maritime metaphors of Caribbean identities, including Muslim Caribbean identities; I emphasize here that Muslims in the Caribbean are *not* different from other Caribbean people in their negotiations with culture and place.

The ongoing becomings of models of Caribbean identity emphasize that it is important to avoid formulating the Caribbean Muslim fullaman as either a rigid ideological fanatic for whom Islam always takes precedence over national and regional belonging, or a secular, "cultural Muslim" marked by loss. Khan says that Hosay processions in Trinidad are watched by "non-Muslim on-lookers as well as nonobservant Muslims, locally termed 'Muslims in name only.' These groups tend to stand along the sidelines and watch the *tadjahs*, drummers, and flag bearers march by, theirs being a secular orientation that might be associated with a parade. Some among them may consume alcohol or dance to the rhythms of the drums."[114] Religious parade-watcher—spectator—is not a nonparticipating role. And does the empty signifier of "Muslim in name only" exist as real, when parade-goers recognize unspoken markers of community in the nonobservant? There are many reasons why an individual might prefer to watch, rather than participate in, a parade—religious or otherwise. Religiosity is a matter of actions performed in public, actions performed in private, and personal belief, and the latter is particularly important in religions—including Islam—that encourage personal relationships with the divine. People's degrees of religious observance and their opinions of religions that they are born or convert into fluctuate, especially when their families, and perhaps partners, remain observant. There are many daily sites of Muslim negotiation, extending far beyond larger sectarian belonging. Does one fast for Ramadan every year, and if so, how much? Does a woman don the hijab, and if so, to what degree and in which settings? Does that woman go to a mosque or pray at home? Does the mosque have a parallel prayer space for women where they can see the imam, or does the mosque house them in, as is often the case, a basement or second floor? Does one engage in a civil marriage alongside the Islamic *nikkah* ceremony? Does the groom pay a *mahr* (bride price), and if so, is it symbolic or material wealth? Does the community follow the doctrine that Muslim men can marry all female "People of the Book," (*'Ahl-al-Kitāb*—Jews, Christians, Sabians) without conversion? At what ages and how are children indoctrinated into particular beliefs and practices? Does one drink alcohol? Listen to instrumental music, or only vocal singing? Pray the required five times a day? Pray the optional daily prayers? Go on the *umrah*, the optional, non-hajj pilgrimage to Mecca? The resolution of these quotidian questions depends on personal, familial, and cultural preferences, as well as sometimes contradictory juridical opinions and theological doctrines. In the Caribbean, "Muslims in name only"—a term that may be used in jest, in coreligionist affection, or in derision by those who believe their

own religious performance denotes greater observance, though it is less derisive than "fullaman"—are likely to have at least been married by an imam, and to have gone to mosques with their extended families to mark the major holidays of Eid al-Adha and Eid al-Fitr, whether they pray, observe, participate, or occupy any combination of subject positions. Religiosity is not linear. It is discursive, partially submerged, tidal, and held in limbo, and the performance of it changes.

That Walcott focuses on the minority Indian cultural inheritance of the Caribbean, rather than the majority Afro-Caribbean history, culture, and postcolonial identity formation that is the backbone of his literary work, is an inclusive gesture—though there is a hint of Indians being unable to creolize. I suggest that Walcott may offer a third choice appropriate to fullaman religiosity that is neither the (re)constitution of cultural purity that never existed, nor a turn to the dominant tropes of Caribbean creolization and hybridity that tend to fix identities and cultures. Instead, the *Ramleela* performance as a fully realized product of both India and the Caribbean implies a model of Caribbean culture in which coterminous radical differences are bisected by what Glissant names "transversality."[115] A transversal line crosses at least two other lines on the same plane and can be used in geometry to determine whether those lines are parallel. Islam is the transversal; the points of crossing are the moments that can be identified as nodal African and Indian fullaman roots, before the fullaman flows off again on any line.

Walcott's early observation of the *Ramleela* set as it was being assembled is a desultory "Deities were entering the field. . . . Costumed actors were arriving. Princes and gods, I suppose." When he comes to understand the particularity and historical significance of the play, he wryly observes of his initial reaction that "'Gods, I suppose' is the shrug that embodies our African and Asian diasporas."[116] The gods of the world—indigenous American, African, Asian, European, Middle Eastern—rode their human horses, *chwal* (cheval), in the godly possession process of Haitian vodou, across land and sea routes to the Americas. As Sylvia Wynter says, the Caribbean postmodern, postslavery project of "the re-writing of knowledge . . . must necessarily entail the un/writing of our present normative defining of the secular mode of the Subject."[117] As previously argued, the Caribbean subject, regardless of ancestral origin, is never a secular one. The Americas contain almost too many gods in various states of remembrance and metamorphosis; yet more deities at first merit a shrug—until, as Walcott comes to understand, what seems to be "theatre" is in actuality "faith," and what seems to be the "visual echo of History" is "a delight of conviction, not loss."[118] "Faith" in Caribbean diasporic communities with their histories of slavery and indentureship means religious faith, faith in community persistence, faith in personal existence, faith in being without fear of becoming. To have faith—the struggle of the fullaman—is to attempt to reconcile one's simultaneous existence as a Muslim, a person of African, Indian, both, or other descent, a citizen of a particular country or countries, a regional Caribbean person, and a participant in the global Islamic

ummah. The fullaman, as I show, therefore exists in many iterations and in different proportions of local and global resonance, all of which resist the figure of the essentialized Muslim.

SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS

This book is arranged in roughly chronological order, as specified earlier. Each chapter, excepting the fourth, begins with Muslim Caribbean historiographic contextualization of the literary diptych that follows.

The first chapter, "Black Literary Islam: Enslaved Learned Men in Jamaica and the Hidden Sufi Aesthetic," first examines the nineteenth-century autobiographical and religious texts of the original fullamen of the Muslim Caribbean: two West African Muslim men enslaved in Jamaica in the early 1800s, Abū Bakr al-Siddīq of Timbuktu and Muhammad Kabā Saghanughu. What these men had in common other than their material circumstances was that they were literate and educated in the Qur'an (they also corresponded with each other). Together they give voice to the peculiar lament of the educated religious person who has become a bonded laborer: fallen very far, a long way from home, and having not much in common with either whites or other enslaved Africans. I argue that by virtue of their Islamic education, they nonetheless managed to secure better lives for themselves, and that recitation and invocation of the Qur'an provided solace and a way to remember their identities and even attempt to propagate their Islamic beliefs in religious and seemingly nonreligious forms. Both men came from West African Sufi families and traditions. I link them to the Sufi postcolonial Guyanese poetry of Abdur-Rahman Slade Hopkinson, whom I call the poet laureate of the Muslim Caribbean, and whose thematically "Muslim poems" I examine in the second half of the chapter. I argue that Afro-Caribbean literary Islam is suffused with a Sufi aesthetic that bridges the time and place of the enslaved men and Hopkinson's Guyanese twentieth century.

The second chapter, "Silence and Suicide: Indo-Caribbean Fullawomen in Post-Plantation Modernity," examines two Guyanese writers' works that are set primarily in the interwar period and mid-twentieth century, when former indentured Indian laborers, their children, and grandchildren began to leave the sugar estates and grapple with changing religious, racial, gender, and class norms. I read Ryhaan Shah's novel *A Silent Place* (2005) and several of Rooplall Monar's short stories written in the 1980s and 1990s to show that, much as the Indo-Caribbean defines itself in opposition to the Afro-Caribbean through the former's positing of Indian women as properly submissive to patriarchal values, so too do Indo-Caribbean Muslims position themselves as the proper Other of the Hindu majority through insistence on the properly Islamic "moral" behavior of Muslim fullawomen. I document the 1995 first Friday *khutbah* sermon given by a Muslim woman in a mosque in the Caribbean (Trinidad), and illustrate the Indo-

Caribbean *jahaji bahin* "ship sister" narrative that rejects the erasure of indentured women's histories on the moral margins of Indian society and their replacement with sanitized domestic narratives of gendered normativity.

The third chapter, "The Marvelous Muslim: Limbo, Logophagy, and Islamic Indigeneity in El Dorado," considers the relevance of the Cuban writer Alejo Carpentier's persistent literary genre of the Caribbean marvelous real, with its concerns over the integration of the postcolonial-to-be into the natural environment, to the fullaman and Muslim Caribbean. I read two Guyanese texts, David Dabydeen's novel *Molly and the Muslim Stick* (2008) and Wilson Harris' novella *The Far Journey of Oudin* (1961), which are set primarily during and after World War II in the preindependence colonial period—though *Molly* continues on into the present—as texts that integrate Islam and Muslims into the complex landscape of the Caribbean marvelous real through the temporally nonlinear, mimetic functions of limbo and doubling, and also through curiously similar incidents of what I call "logophagy," the literal eating of words. I argue that both texts interpellate the Muslim into the Caribbean through negotiation with Amerindian indigeneity and environmental space, showing that Islam—unlike, traditionally, the Indo-Caribbean—does not require mediation through the Afro-Caribbean in order to be naturalized as Caribbean.

In the fourth chapter, "'Muslim Time': The Muslimeen Coup and Calypso in the Trinidad Imaginary," I argue that as a result of a 1990 attempted coup d'état in Trinidad by the primarily Afro-Trinidadian Muslim group the Jamaat al Muslimeen and its leader Yasin Abu Bakr, whom I interview, Trinidad's postcolonial engagement with contemporary Americas discourse on terrorism and the Muslim Other is filtered through coup-influenced nationalism, rather than solely through the lens of historical Indo-Trinidadian Islam. I examine the historical fiction novel *Allah in the Islands* (2009) by Trinidadian writer Brenda Flanagan—the younger sister of Abu Bakr—alongside 1991 postcoup Carnival calypso music on Islam and the insurrection, to show how Afro- and Indo-Trinidadian racial tensions are troubled by the advent of contemporary "new" fullaman Afro-Caribbean conversion to Islam, a religion that is usually associated with and believed "owned" by the Muslim Indo-Caribbean.

The fifth and final chapter, "Mimic Muslim and Ethnorientalist: Global Caribbean Islam and the Specter of Terror," brings the fullaman fully into the contemporary moment of the figure of the global "Muslim terrorist." I explore the application of V. S. Naipaul's figure of the "mimic man," with his aping of the colonizer in service of the postcolonial nation-state, to the globalized Muslim Caribbean. I argue that in the Guyanese writer Jan Lowe Shinebourne's novel *Chinese Women* (2010), the Indo-Guyanese fullaman protagonist attempts and to some extent fails to resist Caribbean cultural mimicry with Islamic particularity when his metropolitan referent shifts post-9/11 from the British colonizer to the idealized Arab Salafist, and he begins to imagine himself as not merely dressing

and thinking "Arab," but as possessing the imagined typical racial characteristics of Middle Eastern people. Postcolonial Caribbean creolization discourse, I conclude, is generally troubled by the Muslim in its midst because the local fullaman Muslim forces engagement with contemporary global concerns and exposes the limitations of hybridity and diaspora.

In the conclusion, I summarize the major interventions of the book and suggest further related fields of Caribbean and Latin American Muslim regional inquiry, in addition to further exploring the humor and pathos of the stereotyped figure of the Muslim in contemporary literature, music, and politics.